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This study investigates whether tariff escalation does occur in the EU's agricul-
tural imports for ten selected product groups, for which developing countries 
are the main source of imports in the Union. Key findings are that tariff escala-
tion does occur, but not for all ten product categories selected for this study. 
Further, the empirical analysis shows no strong evidence of a unambiguous link 
between the level of tariffs and imports: high (or low) import tariffs do not cor-
respond much with low (or high) imports. At the same time, data point at a posi-
tive impact of the EBA agreement on less developed countries' exports to the 
EU since tariffs have been eliminated in 2002. 
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tarieven in 2002 zijn geëlimineerd. 
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Preface 
 
 
Tariffs at the EU border may be an important impediment for all those countries 
that want to sell products in the European market. EU agricultural trade policies 
with its base in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are criticised for taking in 
tariff structures that benefit imports of raw, unprocessed commodities over 
processed agricultural products. Tariff escalation is of special importance to 
developing countries, because they attempt to add value to their agricultural 
products and take advantage of greater returns to differentiated value-added 
goods. Tariff escalation works against such efforts to enter the rapidly growing 
markets of processed products. 
 Several studies provide evidence that tariff escalation is indeed a feature of 
developed countries' tariff structure, although they found that the degree of 
their impact differs between countries and between commodity sectors to pro-
vide insight into the extent and impacts of tariff escalation on the opportunities 
of developing countries' in the EU market. LEI Wageningen UR was commis-
sioned by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality. The study aims 
to quantify the degree of tariff escalation occurrence in the EU import structure 
on ten agricultural product categories and provides estimates of the impact of 
tariff escalation on EU imports as an indication of the effect of protection on the 
EU's processing industry.  
 This project was financed by the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
and Food Quality in the context of the DLO-programme BO-03-003. The study 
was performed by Siemen van Berkum, with assistance from Henk Kelholt for 
the tariff and trade data, and Jeff Powell for the quantitative assessment in sec-
tion 4. The study was supervised by a steering committee with as members 
Henk Massink (Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality), Evert-Jan Kra-
jenbrink (Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality) and Tjalling Dijkstra 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DG International Cooperation). I would like to thank 
the members of the steering committee for their constructive comments during 
the inception and finalisation of the report.  
 
 
 
 
Prof Dr R.B.M. Huirne 
Director General LEI Wageningen UR 
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Summary 
 
 
EU agricultural trade policies with their base in the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) are criticised for taking in tariff structures that benefit imports of raw, un-
processed commodities over processed agricultural products. Tariff escalation 
is at a disadvantage to developing countries who want to export processed 
products in order to promote economic development. In order to provide insight 
into the extent and impacts of tariff escalation on the opportunities of develop-
ing countries to enter the EU market, this brief study analyses the structure of 
EU’s agricultural import tariffs of ten agricultural product categories which are 
important to developing countries, and estimates the possible consequences for 
market access to the EU. 
 The empirical analysis indicates that EU tariff escalation does occur in agri-
cultural imports for a number of the ten selected product categories. Using a 
detailed tariff dataset the conclusion is that the EU applies tariff escalation on its 
imports of cocoa, tomatoes, palm oil, soy, leather and cotton. Import tariffs (as 
percentage, as an amount per tonne or a combination of the two) applied on 
these product categories are higher for processed than for unprocessed prod-
ucts. There are, however, no signs of tariff escalation at EU’s imports of sugar, 
poultry meat, beef, wood and hides & skins. EU import tariffs on sugar and beef 
are high for all tariff lines, both for raw materials as well as processed products. 
The imports of wood and hides & skins are not or only very little taxed by tariffs.  
 Developing countries are the main source of EU imports of all products sub-
ject to this study, except for wood. The EU offers many developing countries 
preferential treatment in their agricultural exports to the Union. The ACP and 
EBA countries in particular benefit from the absence of, or the relatively low EU 
import tariffs.  
 High import tariffs may be a serious obstacle for exporting countries to en-
ter the importing country. The empirical analysis of the data, however, shows no 
strong evidence of an unambiguous link between the level of tariffs and imports: 
high import tariffs do not correspond much with low imports and low tariffs do 
not correlate significantly with high import values. In quite a number of cases it 
was found that the major import item of the product category happened to be 
the one with significant import tariffs (compared to tariffs applied to other prod-
ucts in that group).  
 The lack of a clear relation between (high) tariffs and (low) import flows does 
not, however, indicate tariffs would not act as barriers to trade. The example of 
 7 
the EBA agreement, in force since 2002, points to a positive impact on the less 
developed countries’ export opportunities to the EU after the Union’s import tar-
iffs had been abolished. The data point out that EBA exports have increased 
more than exports from other countries, thereby strengthening their market 
share in EU imports.  
 Next to import tariffs, import levels are determined by many factors such as 
demand and/or consumer preferences, quality and other specific product fea-
tures (which may provide them a price premium) and shortage or lack of do-
mestic supply. The question whether developing countries are hampered to 
export to the EU because of Union’s perceived high tariffs (or, stated otherwise: 
whether developing countries would benefit from an EU import tariff reduction) 
depends on their competitiveness in the international market. To assess this re-
quires further analysis of demand and supply trends in both the EU and develop-
ing countries, and of other market and product specific characteristics that 
should comply with EU public standards on quality and food safety.  
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Samenvatting 
Tariefescalatie bij agrarische invoer in de EU:  
een beoordeling van een aantal producten 
 
 
Het agrarisch handelsbeleid van de EU met zijn basis in het Gemeenschappelijk 
Landbouwbeleid (GLB) wordt bekritiseerd voor het hanteren van een tariefstruc-
tuur waarbij de invoer van ruwe, onverwerkte producten wordt bevoordeeld bo-
ven verwerkte landbouwproducten. Tariefescalatie is vooral nadelig voor 
ontwikkelingslanden die ten behoeve van hun economische ontwikkeling met 
name verwerkte producten op de internationale markt willen aanbieden. Om in-
zicht te bieden in hoeverre tariefescalatie zich voordoet en in hoeverre zo’n ta-
riefstructuur de exportmogelijkheden van ontwikkelingslanden naar de EU 
beïnvloedt, analyseert deze beknopte studie de structuur van de importtarieven 
van de Europese Unie van tien voor ontwikkelingslanden belangrijke agrarische 
exportproducten en wordt een inschatting gemaakt van het consequenties van 
tariefescalatie voor markttoegang tot de EU. 
 De empirische evaluatie wijst uit dat tariefescalatie zich voordoet bij de in-
voer van de EU van een aantal van de tien in deze studie betrokken product-
groepen. Dat is het geval bij de invoer van cacao, tomaten, palmolie, soja, leer 
en katoen. Tariefescalatie doet zich niet voor bij de invoer van suiker, pluimvee-
vlees, rundvlees, hout en huiden. Importtarieven op suiker en rundvlees zijn 
hoog voor veel tarieflijnen, van onverwerkte en verwerkte producten. Op invoer 
van hout en huiden zijn geen of slechts hele geringe tarieven van toepassing. 
 Ontwikkelingslanden zijn de belangrijkste exporteurs van de invoerproducten 
die onderwerp zijn van deze studie, met uitzondering van hout. De EU biedt de-
ze landen een preferentiële behandeling in hun agrarische export naar de Unie. 
Vooral de ACP- en EBA-landen profiteren van geen of relatief lage EU-
importtarieven.  
 Hoge invoertarieven worden gezien als een serieus obstakel voor markttoe-
gang tot exporterende landen. De empirische analyse toont echter geen signifi-
cant en eenduidig verband aan tussen het Europese importtarief en de 
invoerwaarde: hoge invoertarieven corresponderen niet sterk met lage import-
waarden en lage tarieven niet met hoge importwaarden. In nogal wat gevallen 
bleek dat op producten die binnen een groep het meest werden geïmporteerd 
ook de hoogste invoertarieven werden geheven. 
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Het gebrek aan een eenduidig verband tussen (hoge) tarieven en (lage) import-
waarden betekent overigens niet dat tarieven niet als handelsbelemmering op-
treden. Het voorbeeld van de EBA-overeenkomst, sinds 2002 van kracht, wijst 
op een positieve invloed van tariefsverlaging op de exportresultaten van de be-
trokken ontwikkelingslanden: de agrarische export van EBA-landen naar de EU is 
sterker gegroeid dan die uit andere landen, waardoor het aandeel van EBA-
landen in de agrarische invoer van de Unie de laatste jaren is toegenomen.    
 Naast importtarieven wordt import door veel andere factoren beïnvloed; ook 
vraagontwikkelingen en/of consumentenpreferenties, plus een tekort of gebrek 
aan binnenlands aanbod spelen een rol. De vraag of ontwikkelingslanden worden 
belemmerd in hun export naar de EU vanwege de importtarieven (of anders ge-
zegd, de vraag of ontwikkelingslanden zullen profiteren van een reductie van EU-
tarieven) hangt af van hun concurrentiekracht in de internationale markt. Dit 
vergt nader onderzoek van de vraag- en aanbodontwikkelingen in zowel de EU 
als de ontwikkelingslanden, inclusief de markt- en productspecifieke kenmerken 
waaronder de eis aan de kwaliteitsstandaarden te voldoen. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background, research questions and approach 
 
Tariff escalation occurs when tariff levels increase with the degree of process-
ing of a product. This favours imports of raw materials and discourages local 
processing in the exporting country. Tariff escalation is of special importance to 
developing countries, because as developing countries attempt to add value to 
their agricultural products and take advantage of greater returns to differenti-
ated value-added goods, tariff escalation works against their efforts to enter the 
rapidly growing markets of processed products. Tariff escalation is particularly 
pronounced in agriculture, with processed agricultural products being subject to 
significantly higher tariffs than raw farm products (FAO, 2005: 42). The fact that 
the developed countries' tariff structures protect the market for processed 
products more than they do for primary products is seen as an obstacle for the 
industrial and economic development of developing countries (World Bank, 
2007; FAO, 2004). Due to its development objectives the WTO Doha negotia-
tions address tariff escalation. 
 Without further quantification or reference to specific empirical studies on 
this issue, the Social Economic Council (SER) calls tariff escalation a serious 
impediment for developing countries to enter the European market. EU agricul-
tural trade policies with its base in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are 
criticised for taking in tariff structures that benefit imports of raw, unprocessed 
commodities over processed agricultural products. Several studies provide evi-
dence that tariff escalation is indeed a feature of developed countries' tariff 
structure, although they found that the degree of their impact differs between 
countries and between commodity sectors (part of which is of particular interest 
to developing countries and part is not).1 In order to provide insight into the ex-
tent and impacts of tariff escalation on the opportunities of developing coun-
tries' to enter the EU market, this report attempts to quantify the degree of tariff 
escalation occurrence in the EU import structure on ten agricultural product 
categories and provides estimates of the impact of tariff escalation on EU im-
ports as an indication of the effect of protection on the EU's processing indus-
                                                   
1 For an overview see J. Wainio and D. Vanzetti (2008). Tariff escalation in the Doha Talks - Bringing 
the Issues to resolution. Australian Agricultural and resource Economics Society (AARES) 52nd Annual 
Conference, 5-8 February 2008. 
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try. To determine whether the EU applies tariff escalation to a greater extent 
than other developed countries, the USA's import tariff structures are also pre-
sented and discussed.  
 This report hence aims at answering three (sets of) questions: 
1. Does the EU's import tariff structure show significant tariff escalation? How 
does the EU's tariff structure compare to applied US import tariffs? Does the 
EU practice tariff escalation to a greater extent than the US? 
2. What are the levels of imports of the selected agricultural products, and are 
they differentiated according to processing level and country of origin? Are 
developing countries at a disadvantage? 
3. Is there a relation between the level of a tariff and import flow? Do high tar-
iffs restrict imports significantly? 
 
 The analysis focuses on existing trade flows and ignores the possibility that 
there might be situations in which developing countries could not export their 
products because of the high tariff barriers by the EU. This issue is briefly dis-
cussed in the conclusion of this report. 
 Product categories selected for answering the above formulated questions 
are (processed and unprocessed items from) cocoa, tomatoes, palm oil, soy-
beans, sugar, skins & leather, beef, poultry, wood and cotton. The selection of 
these products has been made in consultation with the client, the Ministry of 
LNV. The rational for this selection is that these products are important export 
products for many developing countries, while at the same time these com-
modities are important agricultural imports of the EU. 
 We use the tariff dataset with 2004 data (MacMapHS6 Version 2.1), com-
piled and processed by the GTAP consortium1 for the selection of the tariffs of 
the European Union and the USA. These data have been linked to data on EU-15 
import values taken from the UN-COMTRADE trade database, to show the rela-
tion between tariff levels and trade flows. The analysis is conducted at HS 6-
digit product level - this is the most detailed level at which world wide data on 
tariffs and trade flows are available.  
 
 
                                                   
1 Global Trade Analysis Project which is a global network of economic policy analysts working to-
gether and using a global trade model with a database that contains bilateral trade information. 
LEI is part of this network.  
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1.2 Objectives and structure of the report 
 
The objective of this report is to provide insights into the tariff structure of EU 
agricultural products and the presence and extent of tariff escalation, and to 
analyse the consequences of tariff escalation on imports from developing coun-
tries. However, it should already be made clear from the outset that imports - 
levels as well as their origin - cannot be explained by the level of tariffs only: im-
ports depend on many other factors such as income levels, consumer prefer-
ences, competing domestic supply, vicinity of countries and a number of 
product features such as quality. A country's position in international trade is 
also increasingly related to its ability to comply with standards and regulations 
focused on quality, food safety, animal welfare, et cetera (non-tariff measures). 
It is outside the scope of this brief assignment to go into all of the relevant fac-
tors that may explain trade flows. As statements on the link between tariff esca-
lation and import flows are based only on the available tariff and trade data, 
these are highly indicative. 
 The structure of the report is as follows. Chapter 2 briefly presents the out-
line of the EU's external relations with developing countries, focused on agri-
cultural trade agreements. Chapter 3 reports for each selected agricultural 
commodity on EU's tariff structure, the level of EU imports and their origin, and 
the link between tariff structure and import levels. Similar information and analy-
sis are presented for the USA. Chapter 4 examines the relation between the 
levels of applied tariffs and the import flows. Chapter 5 summarises the main 
findings and concludes with some observations.  
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2 EU agricultural trade policy and its 
relations with developing countries 
 
In its Common Agricultural Policy the EU applies the principle of domestic mar-
ket support and protects the market against imports by means of import tariffs. 
Rates of import charges are set either as ad valorem percentage rates (% of 
import value) or as absolute values (in terms of euro per tonne). In certain cases 
a combination of both systems is applied.  
 Most of the EU's import tariffs for agricultural products are set in the EU's 
tariff schedules within the WTO Uruguay Round. These represent the legal 
maximum rates - bound rates - at which tariffs may be set for each product. For 
various reasons the EU may choose to set applied tariffs for specific products 
at below the maxima, as part of a bilateral or multilateral trade deal with one or 
more third countries.  
 Although under the Uruguay Round rules the basic tariffs should in principle 
be the sole form of market protection against imports, in practice certain other 
mechanisms are permitted. A particularly significant mechanism is tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs). Under this regime a lower tariff rate can apply to a given annual 
quantity of imported product, with a higher rate - though no higher than the 
WTO-bound maximum - applying on imports above that volume. Traders wishing 
to import under TRQ must be in possession of a relevant import licence.  
 Relations with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries (former colo-
nies of the original six member states of the Community) are established in 
Conventions (Yaounde, Lome, 1975; Cotonou, 2000) in which arrangements 
have been made on trade and aid. Virtually all imports from ACP countries can 
enter the EU duty free, with a few exceptions. There are TRQs granted to ACP 
countries for sugar (1.3m tonne white sugar duty free, imported at EU prices), 
bananas (775,000 tonnes of duty free) and beef (52,100 tonnes against 8% of 
EU's full import tariff).  
 In 2001 the EU drew up a trade programme which consciously gave signifi-
cant trade advantage to the world's 48 Least Developed Countries. The scheme 
essentially eliminates quotas and duties on all products except arms from the 
world's poorest countries. Full trade liberalisation also extends to agricultural 
products with three exceptions: sugar, rice and bananas. In these cases, liber-
alisation is being phased in over a transition period ending in July 2009. 
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 In view of the increasing erosion of the trade preferences established be-
tween the EU and ACP countries - because of the WTO-inspired reductions in 
general tariffs and the adoption of the Everything But Arms initiative in 2001 - 
the EU-ACP trade relations are presently in a process of being rearranged in 
Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and appropriate groups of 
ACP countries. These Partnerships are expected to be established in the course 
of 2009 and will replace the traditional set of trade preferences between the EU 
and each country, which expired at the end of 2007.1 
 The EU not only has multilateral agreements under the WTO, and with ACP 
and EBA countries, but also specific agreements with other countries or re-
gions. The most significant for trade in agriculture and food are with candidate 
and potential candidate member states in south and south-eastern Europe  
(Balkan region), with South Africa, and with Mediterranean and Middle East coun-
tries. Among other things, the agreements include concessional agricultural 
trade, either on a bilateral or on a regional basis. A bilateral agreement with 
Mercosur (the South America trade bloc) has been put on the back burner while 
the multilateral Doha Round negotiations have been continuing.  
 The above review indicates that the EU has offered many developing coun-
tries concessions in agricultural exports to the Union. Especially the ACP and 
EBA countries benefit from the absence of - or relatively low - import tariffs 
when exporting to the EU. 
 
                                                   
1 More and up to date details on the process of EPA negotiations can be found at 
www.agritrade.cta.int.  
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3 Tariff structures and import flows of 
selected agricultural product categories 
 
 
This chapter provides insights into the structure of EU import tariffs of selected 
product categories and shows the import levels of the Union for these products. 
Conclusions on whether the EU's import regime is characterised by tariff escala-
tion are based on the tariff structures presented. Trade and tariff data are com-
bined to evaluate the relation between tariff levels and the amount of imports.  
 
 
3.1 Cocoa 
 
Chapter 18 in the UN international trade statistics COMTRADE distinguishes be-
tween cocoa products such as beans, paste, butter, powder and chocolate (see 
table 3.1). Ascending numbers indicate an increasing level of processing. The 
first tariff lines mentioned with HS (Harmonised system - a UN defined system of 
product categories in trade statistics) codes 180100 and 180200 (beans and 
shells) are raw, unprocessed commodities. Tariff lines HS180310 to HS180610 
(paste, butter and cocoa powder) are semi-processed products. Other tariff 
lines refer to processed products.  
 
Table 3.1 Tariff lines (HS codes) for cocoa 
180100 Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted 
180200 Cocoa shells, husks, skins and waste 
180310 Cocoa paste not defatted 
180320 Cocoa paste wholly or partly defatted 
180400 Cocoa butter, fat, oil 
180500 Cocoa powder, unsweetened 
180610 Cocoa powder, sweetened 
180620 Chocolate and other food preps containing cocoa >2k 
180631 Chocolate, cocoa preps, block, slab, bar, filled, >2k 
180632 Chocolate, cocoa prep, block/slab/bar, not filled,>2k 
180690 Chocolate/cocoa food preparations nes 
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 Table 3.2 shows how the EU's tariff structure for cocoa has been build up. 
Tariffs in this table indicate those according to the WTO Most-Favoured Nations 
clause, the 'bounds' (maximum levels) according to WTO Uruguay Round 
agreement and the applied specific and ad valorem tariffs. The applied tariffs 
are usually lower than the bound tariffs. Some tariff lines are differentiated ac-
cording to the country of origin: the tariff line indicates more than one tariff, as 
shown for HS180320 (cocoa paste) and ascending HS codes.  
 
Table 3.2 Tariff structure for cocoa at EU border, at HS6-digit level 
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180100 0 0 0 0 1,825 ,084 
180200 0 0 0 0 563 20 
180310 9.6 0 0 0 2,594 312 
180320 9.6 0 0 0; 6.1;9.6 1,997 39 
180400 7.7 0 0 0; 4.2; 7.7 3,218 729 
180500 8.0 0 0 0; 2.8; 8 2,455 47 
180610 8.0 305.9 305.9 0; 3.65;8 1,787 11 
180620 9.5 0 0 0; 5.8; 9.5 2,126 91 
180631 8.3 0 0 0; 4.8; 8.3 3,271 139 
180632 8.3 0 0 0; 4.8; 8.3 3,606 290 
180690 8.3 0 0 0; 4.8; 8.3 3,974 451 
Total EU imports 5,106 
Of which from developing countries b) 3,350 
a) EU-15 imports; b) WTO definition of developing countries. 
 
The table above shows that: 
- There are no tariffs on the commodities beans and shells; 
- Along with zero tariffs there are import tariffs on semi-processed products in 
the range of 1-9.6%;  
- An importer has to pay USD305 per tonne for sweetened cocoa powder 
(HS180610).1 This equals an ad valorem tariff of around 15% based on a 
                                                   
1 This tariff is linked to the sugar market regime in the EU in which import tariffs are an important in-
strument (see also section 3.4 on sugar in this report) 
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world market price of nearly USD1,800 in 2007. Further to this specific tar-
iff, imports from a number of countries are subject to an ad valorem tariff of 
3.65% or 8%. Most developing countries - at least the ACP and EBA coun-
tries - pay no tariffs at all;  
- Imports of HS180620 to 180690 (chocolate) enter tariff-free or with ad 
valorem tariffs varying between almost 1% to more than 8%. Tariffs are a bit 
lower than those for semi-processed products like paste. 
 
 Table 3.2 also shows EU's import value for each HS6 product for 2007. By 
far the most important imported product is cocoa beans; about 60% of total 
import value. Other major import flows are cocoa butter (180400) and choco-
late (180632 and 180690).  
 Ivory Coast, Ghana, Cameroon and Nigeria (all four ACP countries) are the 
most important countries of origin for cocoa beans imported by the EU: imports 
from these countries account for about 85% of all cocoa imports by the EU-15. 
Most of these imports are cocoa beans, of which 95% are from these four coun-
tries. Cocoa butter and paste are the EU's second and third most import cocoa 
import product. The Ivory Coast is the major supplier, next to Malaysia and In-
donesia although the imports from the latter countries are being charged 4.2% 
ad valorem tariffs which, however, did not prevent imports valued at USD230m 
in 2007 entering the EU, a third of the Union's total cocoa butter imports. Im-
ports of cocoa powder (HS 180610) is heavily taxed and very low. Imports of 
chocolate products (HS 180620 and ascending numbers) are mainly from Swit-
zerland. Total EU imports valued USD5.1bn, of which 3.3 came from developing 
countries, largely in the form of beans, paste and butter.  
 
USA tariff structure and import flows  
The US import tariff structure related to cocoa beans and processed products 
shows similarities with the EU, yet there are important differences as well. Tar-
iffs are absent at the unprocessed products (HS180100 and HS180200), as is 
the case for EU imports (table 3.3). Ad valorem percentages on pasta, butter 
and powder imports into the USA are zero, while these may increase to 8% in 
the EU. Major discrepancies between the EU and the USA are to be found in the 
application of specific tariffs: while the EU applies this instrument only to HS 
180610 (cocoa powder, sweetened), the USA uses specific tariffs for HS 
180500, 180610, 180620, 180632 and 180690. Their level is in the range of 
5-10% of the import price.  
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Table 3.3 Tariff structure for cocoa at USA border, at HS6-digit level 
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180100 0 0 0 0 1,825 780 
180200 0 0 0 0 563 0 
180310 0 0 0 0 2,594 56 
180320 0 2 2 0 1,997 44 
180400 0 0 0 0 3,218 384 
180500 0 5.20 5.20 0 2,455 5 
180610 0 312.20 276.50 0 1,787 3 
180620 6.4 291.41 167-291 0-6.6 2,126 446 
180631 5.6 0 0 5.6 3,271 134 
180632 4.9 337.50 139-337.50 0-4.9 3,606 73 
180690 6 382 223-382 0-5.4 3,974 306 
Total  2,231 
 
 US cocoa imports accounted for USD2.2m in 2007. Where EU imports are 
dominated by the imports of cocoa beans, US imports more equally distributed 
around raw, semi-processed and processed products. Imports of raw produce are 
largely from Ivory Coast, Indonesia, Ecuador Papua New Guinea, Ghana and Do-
minican Republic. Semi-processed and processed products are mainly from Can-
ada and Mexico. Both countries do not cultivate cocoa beans but apparently there 
is a significant processing of beans resulting in exports of semi-processed prod-
ucts and chocolate to the USA. Trade among these three countries may benefit 
from the free trade agreement NAFTA, established in 1996.  
 In summary, both the import tariff structures of the EU and the USA indicate 
tariff escalation: tariffs on raw produces are non-existent while imports of (semi) 
processed products are subject to specific and/or ad valorem tariff rates. EU 
imports of cocoa are largely raw produce (beans and paste). The EU also im-
ports butter which is taxed by 7.7% ad valorem tariff. Cocoa powder is subject 
to a significant specific tariff; imports are really low. Tariffs on semi-processed 
and processed products remain below 10%. The USA, however, applies specific 
tariffs to imports of a number of (semi) processed products tariffs, next to ad 
valorem tariffs. This indicates stronger tariff escalation in the US tariff structure 
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than noted in the EU's tariff structure. Yet, its tariff structure does not seem to 
have had much impact on the US import flows, half of which are processed 
products.  
 
 
3.2 Tomato 
 
Trade statistics for tomatoes are registered as fresh tomatoes (HS 070200), 
prepare/preserved (HS 200210/2000290), as juice (HS 200950) and ketchup 
or other tomato sauces (HS 210320). 
 
Table 3.4 Tariff lines (HS codes) for tomatoes, at HS6-digit level  
070200 Tomatoes, fresh or chilled 
200210 Tomatoes, whole/pieces, prepared/preserved, no vinegar 
200290 Tomatoes nes, prepared or preserved, not in vinegar 
200950 Tomato juice not fermented or spirited 
210320 Tomato ketchup and other tomato sauces 
 
 Table 3.5 presents the WTO bound and the applied tariffs to tomato import 
in the EU. Fresh tomatoes come in without any tariff, although the EU has the 
option to apply a specific tariff of USD370 per tonne (which is equal to 33% of 
the - calculated - average international price in 2007). Imports of preserved to-
matoes have free entry or they are charged with an import tariff ranging from 
10 to 14.4% depending on the origin of the import. Imports of juices and 
sauces are charged too, with tariffs up to 16.7% on tomato juice. This overview 
of EU tariffs applied indicates tariff escalation in the product category of toma-
toes. 
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Table 3.5 Tariff structure for tomatoes at EU border, at HS6-digit level 
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070200 10.7 370.2 0 0 1,106 524 
200210 14.4 0 0 0-14.4 590 20 
200290 14.4 0 0 0-14.4 709 129 
200950 16.4 0 0 0; 16.4 470 2 
210320 10.2 0 0 0-10.2 1,203 49 
Total  724 
Of which from developing countries b) 555 
a) EU 15 imports; b) WTO definition of developing countries. 
 
 The import value of tomato products from outside the EU-15 is a bit more 
than USD700m in 2007. Most imports are fresh tomatoes, which are mainly 
from Morocco (USD360m in 2007) and Israel (USD55m), based on a zero im-
port tariff.1 Tomatoes prepared (HS 200290) are mainly from China, while im-
ports face a 14.4% tariff. Turkey is the major supplier of EU imports of tomato 
product categories HS 200210 (prepared, et cetera) and HS 210320 (ketchup). 
These imports from Turkey are not subject to ad valorem tariffs.  
 
Tariff structure of and import flows into the USA 
USA imports in this product category are largely fresh tomatoes (see table 3.6), 
which originate from Mexico and Canada. Imports from these NAFTA countries 
are free of tariffs. The US tariff structure does include specific tariffs on fresh 
tomato and on tomato juice. These are applied to imports from, among others, 
New Zealand, Morocco, Chili and the Philippines. Because of this, imports from 
these countries is all but absent. In addition, there are tariffs on prepared toma-
toes and ketchup/sauces. These tariffs are lower than those applied by the EU 
to the same categories.  
 
                                                   
1 Imports of fresh tomatoes are subject to EU’s fruit and vegetable entry price system, broadly in-
tended to bring import prices up to an established minimum import price. Detailed rules are laid down 
in Commission Regulation 1590/2007 (21 December 2007). 
 21 
Table 3.6 Tariff structure for tomatoes at USA border, at HS6-digit level 
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070200 0 31.7 0; 19.3;22.3;31.7 0 1,106 1,255 
200210 12.5 0 0 0; 12.5 590 10 
200290 11.6 0 0 0-11.6 709 26 
200950 0 1.4 0-1.4 0 470 1 
210320 8.8 0 0 0-8.8 1,203 99 
Total  1,391 
 
 In summary, both the import tariff structures of the EU and the USA indicate 
tariff escalation. By far, most imports are fresh tomatoes, imported tariff free 
by both the EU and USA, indicating that there is a clear (negative) relation be-
tween the level of the tariff and the import value. The tariff wedge between the 
raw and the processed products is higher in the EU than in the US (16.4% ver-
sus 12.5%). 
 
 
3.3 Palm oil 
 
Trade statistics distinguish four tariff lines related to palm oil products (see  
table 3.7). Nuts and kernels are unprocessed raw materials, which are little 
traded internationally. Much more trade is in crude and processed oil, as well as 
in the oil cake, the product that results from crushing, next to oil.  
 
Table 3.7 Tariff lines of palm oil products at EU border 
Hs Commodity 
120710 Palm nuts and kernels 
151110 Palm oil, crude 
151190 Palm oil, other than crude, & fractions thereof , whether/not refined but not 
chemically modified 
230660 Oil-cake & other solid residues, whether/not ground/in pellets, from extraction of 
palm nuts/kernels 
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 The EU's tariff structure of palm oil products presented in table 3.8 indicates 
tariff escalation: there is no tariff applied to imports of raw, unprocessed nuts 
and kernels, only a low tariff on crude oil imports and the highest tariffs are 
found on processed oil imports. Meanwhile, EU tariffs are not that high: the 
maximum tariff on processed oil is only 9.5%. 
 
Table 3.8 Tariff structure for palm oil at EU border 
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120710 0 0 0 0 753 3 
151110 1.9 0 0 0; 1.9 430 1,888 
151190 9.5 0 0 0; 3.2;8.9;9.5 440 925 
230660 0 0 0 0 67 331 
Total EU imports 3,147 
Of which from developing countries b) 2,651 
a) EU 15 imports; b) WTO definition of developing countries. 
 
 EU-15 total imports of palm oil products values up to USD3.1bn in 2007. 
Malaysia and Indonesia - world's major palm oil producers and exporters - are by 
far the most dominant trading partners in imports of crude and refined oil as 
well as of oil-cake. The imports of refined oil from Malaysia and Indonesia is 
taxed by 9.5% import tariffs, while still accounting for 90% of EU's imports of 
this item. 
 The tariff structure of the USA is quite different from the EU: the USA does 
not apply tariffs to any of the four products (table 3.9). The USA largely imports 
processed oil: imports values over USD500m in 2007, coming from USD50-
60m in the years around 2000. These increased imports are fully accounted for 
by Malaysia.  
 In sum, then, the figures show tariff escalation at EU imports but not at US 
imports of palm oil.  
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Table 3.9 Tariff structure for palm oil at USA border 
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120710 0 0 0 0 753 0 
151110 0 0 0 0 430 1 
151190 0 0 0 0 440 558 
230660 0 3.2 0 0 67  0 
Total  559 
 
  
3.4 Sugar 
 
The category of 'sugars and sugar confectionery' consists of 17 tariff lines at  
6-digit level (see table 3.10). The 'unprocessed commodities' are the result of a 
first refining. After that several steps in processing follow. Intermediate prod-
ucts are included in the category of first processing stage. 
 
Table 3.10 Tariff lines for sugar and confectionery at EU 
border 
Unprocessed raw material 
170111 Cane sugar, raw, in solid form, not containing added flavouring/colouring 
matter 
170112 Beet sugar, raw, in solid form, not containing added flavouring/colouring 
matter 
First processing level 
170191 Cane/beet sugar & chemically pure sucrose, in solid form, containing added 
flavouring/colouring matter 
170199 Cane/beet sugar & chemically pure sucrose, in solid form, not containing 
added flavouring/colouring matter 
170211 Lactose & lactose syrup, containing by weight 99%/more lactose, 
expressed as anhydrous lactose, calc. on the dry matter 
170219 Lactose & lactose syrup, containing by weight >95% but <99% lactose, 
expressed as anhydrous lactose, calc. on the dry matter 
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Table 3.10 Tariff lines for sugar and confectionery at EU border 
(continued) 
170220 Maple sugar & maple syrup 
170230 Glucose & glucose syrup, not containing fructose/containing in the dry state 
<20% by weight of fructose 
170240 Glucose & glucose syrup, containing in the dry state at least 20% but < 50% by 
weight of fructose (exclusive invert sugar) 
170250 Chemically pure fructose 
170260 Fructose (exclusive chemically pure fructose) & fructose syrup, containing in the 
dry state >50% by weight of fructose (exclusive invert sugar) 
170290 Sugars, inclusive invert sugar & other sugar & sugar syrup blends containing in 
the dry state 50% by weight of fructose (exclusive of 1702.11-1702.60) 
170310 Cane molasses 
170390 Molasses, other than cane molasses, resulting from the extraction/refining of 
sugar 
Processed products 
170410 Chewing gum, whether/not sugar-coated 
170490 Sugar confectionery other than chewing gum (inclusive white chocolate), not 
containing cocoa 
 
 The sugar and confectionery import tariff structure of the EU is rather com-
plex (see table 3.11). What should be noted is the frequent application of spe-
cific tariffs. These tariffs are extremely high for raw material (some 200% of the 
international price) and significant for many 'first stage processed products'. 
Those processed products with most value added and highest world market 
prices are subject to ad valorem tariffs but their specific import tariffs are rela-
tively low. Tariff protection therefore seems much higher for raw and semi-
processed products than for final processed products, indicating a reverse of 
tariff escalation. 
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Table 3.11 Tariff structure for sugar and confectionery at EU border 
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170111 0 470.81 470.81 c) 0 247 1,295 
170112 0 470.81 470.81 0 247 7 
170191 0 520.50 520.50 0 385 3 
170199 0 520.50 520.50 d) 0 266 330 
170211 0 173.91 173.91 e) 0 718 27 
170219 0 173.91 173.91 0 1,113 1 
170220 4 2.48 2.48 4 3,464 42 
170230 0 358.51 358.51 0 352 15 
170240 0 439.13 439.13 0 477 6 
170250 16 629.81 629.81 f) 0 1,180 108 
170260 0 213.25 213.25 0 606 25 
170290 1.4 164.53 164.53 g) 0-1.4 831 34 
170310 0 4.35 0-4.35 0 65 218 
170390 0 4.35 0-4.35 0 108 71 
170410 18 360.25 0 18 3,096 55 
170490 9.45 56.02 0-56.02 0-9.45 2,827 483 
Total EU imports 2,720 
Of which from developing countries b) 1,897 
a) EU 15 imports; b) WTO definition of developing countries; c) India excluded, yet subject to a TRQ; d) Croatia, 
Aruba and India excluded; e) Israel en Morocco excluded; f) Israel excluded; g) Cape Verde and Aruba excluded. 
 
 Total EU-15 sugar imports were valued at about USD2.7bn in 2007. Two-
thirds of this amount comes from developing countries. Raw sugar cane for fur-
ther refinery and processing is the major import product. Most important sup-
pliers are Mauritius (USD322m), Guyana (142), Fiji (118), Jamaica (98) and 
Swaziland (86), all these imports are subject to the ACP Sugar Protocol that al-
lows ACP countries to export 1.3m tonne raw sugar to the EU without import 
duties being charged. Cane/beet sugar in solid form (170199) is mainly from 
Croatia, which imports is not taxed by specific or ad valorem tariffs as part of a 
bilateral agreement. Pakistan and India - only recently - are the main suppliers of 
cane molasses (170310), a residual product of the first stage in the sugar re-
finery process on which imports are charged a relatively low specific tariffs. Im-
ports of sugar confectionery belonging to the HS170490 category are largely 
from east European countries like Poland and Czech Republic which are now 
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member of the European Union. 
 The tariff structure of the USA (table 3.12) shows that the level of protection 
is much lower compared to EU tariffs: although the US applies ad valorem tar-
iffs more often to specific tariff lines than the EU, US specific import tariffs are 
in most cases much lower so that the overall protection rate is less in the US 
case. Imports are largely raw cane sugar (against a small specific tariff of al-
most USD5 per tonne) and sugar confectionery products (HS 170490), which 
are subject to relatively high tariff rates (ad valorem plus specific tariff together 
add up to 15% of the world market price). 
 
Table 3.12 Tariff structure for sugar and confectionery at USA border 
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170111 0 338.70 4.87 0 247 754 
170112 0 357.40 357.40 0 247 0 
170250 9.6 0 0 9.6 1,180 5 
170191 4.9 129.43 129.43 4.9 385 49 
170199 0 357.40 357.40 0 266 110 
170211 6.4 0 0 0 718 5 
170219 6.4 0 0 6.4 1,113 0 
170220 2.55 84.50 84.50 2.55 3,464 143 
170230 4,275 47.75 47.75 4,275 352 27 
170240 5.55 84.75 84.75 5.55 477 26 
170260 5.55 84.75 84.75 5.55 606 31 
170290 2.55 173.56 173.56 2.55 831 27 
170310 0 1.31 1.31 0 65 108 
170390 0 1.30 1.30 0 108 28 
170410 4 0 0 4 3,096 126 
170490 7.4 171.43 171.43 0-7.4 2,827 997 
Total 2,436 
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 Summarising this section, the data shows relatively high tariffs but no evi-
dence of tariff escalation in the EU's sugar import tariff structure. The latter also 
holds for the US while their import tariffs on sugar are generally (much) lower 
than those the EU applies.  
 
 
3.5 Poultry meat 
 
Table 3.13 below presents a description of 16 poultry meat tariff lines. Prod-
ucts are split into three categories: unprocessed, semi-processed and proc-
essed.  
 
Table 3.13 Tariff lines for poultry meat at the EU border 
Unprocessed 
020711 Meat of fowls of species Gallus domesticus, not cut in pieces, fresh/chilled 
020712 Meat of fowls of species Gallus domesticus, not cut in pieces, frozen 
020724 Meat of turkeys, not cut in pieces, fresh/chilled 
020725 Meat of turkeys, not cut in pieces, frozen 
020732 Meat of ducks/geese/guinea fowls, not cut in pieces, fresh/chilled 
020733 Meat of ducks/geese/guinea fowls, not cut in pieces, frozen 
Semi-processed 
020713 Cuts & edible offal of species Gallus domesticus, fresh/chilled 
020714 Cuts & edible offal of species Gallus domesticus, frozen 
020726 Cuts & edible offal of turkey, fresh/chilled 
020727 Cuts & edible offal of turkey, frozen 
020734 Fatty livers of ducks/geese/guinea fowls, fresh/chilled 
020735 Meat & edible meat offal of ducks/geese/guinea fowls  
(exclusive of 0207.32-0207.34), fresh/chilled 
020736 Meat & edible meat offal of ducks/geese/guinea fowls  
(exclusive of 0207.32-0207.34), frozen 
Processed 
160231 Prepared/preserved preparations of turkey (exclusive homogenised preparations) 
160232 Prepared/preserved preparations of fowls of the genus Gallus domesticus  
(exclusive homogenised preparations) 
160239 Prepared/preserved preparations of fowls of 01.05  
(exclusive turkey & fowls of the genus Gallus domesticus) 
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 The European Union applies specific tariffs to imports of many poultry meat 
products (table 3.14). These tariffs are about 20-30% of the international (im-
port) prices of unprocessed and semi-processed products, and up to around 
40% in several cases. As a percentage of the import price specific tariffs for 
processed products are lower than those in the US, but the EU applies also ad 
valorem tariffs to imports of these products. So, generally the tariff percentage 
of the import prices is quite similar for all products. Therefore, tariff escalation 
cannot be established.  
 
Table 3.14 Tariff structure for poultry meat at the EU border 
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020711 0 366.87 366.87 0 1,618 21 
020712 0 387.58 387.58 0 818 38 
020724 0 442.86 442.86 0 2,004 20 
020725 0 442.86 442.86 0 2,353 4 
020732 0 575.57 575.57 0 3,772 9 
020733 0 596.27 596.27 0 2,156 94 
020713 0.7 565.63 565.63 0.7 2,361 217 
020714 0.7 565.63 565.63 0-0.7 1,326 517 
020726 0.64 512.80 512.80 0.64 2,814 277 
020727 0.64 512.80 512.80 0.64 1,659 122 
020734 0 0.00 0.00 0 11,482 36 
020735 0.42 806.46 806.46 0.42 6,214 46 
020736 0.37 711.58 711.58 0.37 4,360 157 
160231 8.5 0.00 0.00 8.5 3,864 277 
160232 8.175 269.25 269.25 8.175 3,217 894 
160239 8.175 269.25 269.25 8.175 4,173 117 
Total EU imports  2,846 
Of which from developing countries b) 1,636 
a) EU 15 imports; b) WTO definition of developing countries. 
 
 EU 2007 imports valued up to around USD2.8bn, of which USD1.6bn is 
from developing countries. Major import items are to be found in the semi-
processed category, such as preserved meat (HS160232) and frozen cuts and 
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edible offal (HS020714). Especially the latter is in the higher range of specific 
tariffs, which indicates that despite high tariffs, imports occurs. Major suppliers 
of preserved meat are Thailand (USD505m in 2007) and Brazil (USD265m). 
Brazil is also the main supplier of frozen cuts and edible offal (together with  
Poland, which is within EU25) a position Brazil has taken for many years. Note-
worthy is that EU imports of this group of products from Brazil has increased 
considerably since 2002/2003. Brazil is also the EU15's most important sup-
plier of turkey meat (HS160231). This import flow also has show a significantly 
increasing trend in the last 5 to 10 years.  
 The poultry meat related tariff structure at the US border is quite different 
from the Union's tariff structure. The US structure places bound tariffs for all 
unprocessed and semi-processed products, yet applies only a few of them  
(Table 3.15). The applied specific tariffs are much lower than those applied by 
the EU. Ad valorem tariffs are absent or 6.4%, which is also much lower than EU 
tariffs. The US are a major exporter of poultry meat in the world: imports are 
modest, with USD200m in 2007.  
 
Table 3.15 Tariff structure of poultry meat at the US border 
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020711 0 88.00 0.00 0 1,618 10 
020712 0 88.00 88.00 a) 0 818 2 
020724 0 150.00 0 0 2,004 4 
020725 5 44.00 0 0 2,353 - 
020732 0 88.00 0 0 3,772 0 
020733 0 88.00 0 0 2,156 4 
020713 0 176.00 0 0 2,361 26 
020714 0 176.00 176.00 b) 0 1,326 71 
020726 0 176.00 0 0 2,814 2 
020727 0 176.00 0 0 1,659 5  
020734 0 176.00 0 0 11,482 1 
020735 0 176.00 0 0 6,214 1 
020736 0 176.00 0 0 4,360 2 
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Table 3.15 Tariff structure of poultry meat at the US border (continued) 
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160231 6.4 0 0 0; 6.4 3,864 13 
160232 6.4 0 0 0; 6.4 3,217 64 
160239 6.4 0 0 0; 6.4 4,173 0 
Total  205 
a) Only for China; b) Only for China and India. 
 
 In sum, the EU's import tariff structure on poultry does not indicate tariff es-
calation and most imports are in the category of processed or semi-processed 
products. The US generally applies lower tariffs than the EU, and there are no 
signs of tariff escalation in its tariff structure either.  
 
 
3.6 Bovine meat 
 
Trade statistics on bovine meat products refer to 12 HS codes on 6-digit level. 
These are presented in table 3.16 below. Products are split into 4 unprocessed, 
2 semi-processed and 6 processed products. 
 
Table 3.16 Tariff lines for bovine meat at the EU border 
Unprocessed 
020110 Carcasses/half-carcasses of bovine animals, fresh/chilled 
020120 Meat of bovine animals, fresh/chilled (exclusive of 0201.10), bone-in 
020210 Carcasses/half-carcasses of bovine animals, frozen 
020220 Meat of bovine animals, frozen (exclusive of 0202.10), bone-in 
Semi-processed 
020130 Meat of bovine animals, fresh/chilled, boneless 
020230 Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless 
Processed 
020610 Edible offal of bovine animals, fresh/chilled 
020621 Tongues of bovine animals, frozen 
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Table 3.16 Tariff lines for bovine meat at the EU border (continued) 
020622 Livers of bovine animals, frozen 
020629 Edible offal of bovine animals (exclusive tongues & livers), frozen 
021020 Meat of bovine animals, salted/in brine/dried/smoked 
160250 Prepared/preserved preparations of bovine animals (exclusive homogenised 
preparations), inclusive mixtures 
 
 Import tariffs of bovine meat are relatively high (table 3.17). Except for two 
products, all imports of bovine meat are subject to specific tariffs. These spe-
cific tariffs are one third to about 70% of the import price; in case of HS020210 
(carcasses frozen) the specific tariff is even higher than the import price. The 
EU also applies ad valorem tariffs to imports of these products: to unprocessed 
and semi-processed products 12.8% and different rates to the processed prod-
ucts. All together, the EU's bovine meat protection rates are high. The composi-
tion of the tariffs structure does not however indicate tariff escalation.  
 Imports of bovine products in the EU are largely fresh/chilled (HS020130) 
and rozen boneless meat (HS 020230). These two product categories account 
for more than 70% of total import value of USD3.2bn in 2007. Brazil 
(USD663m) and Argentina (USD553m) are main suppliers of fresh/chilled bone-
less meat. It is worth mentioning that imports from Brazil are subject to the full 
specific tariff of USD3,769 per tonne while the EU charges only 50% of that tar-
iff on imports from Argentina. Brazil also accounts for the highest share (72%) in 
EU15's import of frozen boneless meat (HS020230). Again these imports are 
subject to substantial specific tariff (USD2,315 per tonne, less than the maxi-
mum that is applied). Botswana is EU's major supplier of fresh/chilled and fro-
zen bovine meat out of the ACP group of states. This country exports to the EU 
without paying ad valorem and specific import tariffs up to a maximum quantity 
of 52,100 tonnes (an annual quota that is shared with Namibia, Kenya, Mada-
gascar, Swaziland and Zimbabwe).  
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Table 3.17 Tariff structure for bovine meat at EU border 
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020110 12.8 2,196.27 2,196.27 12.8 3,267 216 
020120 12.8 2,470.81 2,470.81 c) 12.8 3,305 243 
020210 12.8 2,196.27 2,196.27 12.8 1,510 2 
020220 12.8 2,498.76 1,756.52 12.8 2,885 7 
020130 12.8 3,768.94 3,768.94 c) 12.8 4,571 1686 
020230 12.8 3,090.27 3,090.27 d) 12.8 2,314 646 
020610 3.2 942.24 942.24 3.2 2,407 9 
020621 0 0 0 0 4,700 2 
020622 0 0 0 0 749 1 
020629 4.3 1,259.21 1,259.21 4.3 1,490 7 
021020 15.4 3,531.68 3,531.68 15.4 7,375 26 
160250 12.45 942.24 942.24 12.45 2,983 394 
Total EU imports 3,239 
Of which from developing countries b) 2,412 
a) EU 15 imports; b) WTO definition of developing countries; c) Chili excluded; d) Chili excluded; 5) Australia, 
Lebanon and Madagascar excluded. 
 
 US import tariffs of bovine meat are completely different from those in the 
EU (table 3.18). The USA applies rather low specific tariffs to unprocessed and 
semi-processed beef products. Ad valorem tariffs - also applied to these two 
categories - are again significantly higher than those applied by the EU. While 
specific and ad valorem tariffs are not applied on processed products, this US 
import tariff structure indicates tariff escalation.  
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Table 3.18 Tariff structure for bovine meat at the US border 
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020110 26.4 0 0;22;44 0 3,267 38 
020120 26.4 0 0;7.3; 14.7 26.4 3,305 136 
020210 26.4 0 0;22;44 26.4 1,510 0.7 
020220 26.4 0 0;7.3;14.7 26.4 2,885 10.8 
020130 26.4 0 0; 7.3; 14.7 26.4 4,571 1,080 
020230 15.2 0 0;17.6 15.2 2,314 1,684 
020610 0 0 0 0 2,407 45,3 
020621 0 0 0 0 4,700 4,1 
020622 0 0 0 0 749 0,5 
020629 0 0 0 0 1,490 65,7 
021020 0 0 0 0 7,375 16,9 
160250 2.1 0 0 2.1 2,983 455 
Total  3,404 
 
 Summarising the above: the EU's bovine meat protection rates are high, es-
pecially because of the application of specific tariffs. The composition of the tar-
iffs structure does not, however, indicate tariff escalation. The US, on the other 
hand, applies tariff escalation in their beef imports.  
 
 
3.7 Soybeans 
 
Trade statistics distinguish between four tariff lines with respect to soybeans 
and its products: soybeans, soybean oil (crude and other than crude) and oil 
cake of soybean oil (see table 3.19). 
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Table 3.19 Tariff lines for soy beans 
120100 Soya beans, whether/not broken 
150710 Soya bean oil, crude, whether/not degummed, not chemically modified 
150790 Soya bean oil, other than crude, & fractions thereof , whether/not refined but not 
chemically modified 
230400 Oil-cake & other solid residues, whether/not ground/in pellets, from extraction of 
soya bean oil 
 
 EU ad valorem tariffs on imports of soybean oil are relatively low; on oil 
other than crude oil the EU applies a higher tariff than to crude oil imports  
(table 3.20). Tariffs on imports of beans and oil cake are zero. The difference 
between tariff rates on soybeans (the raw material) and oil (a product with high 
value added) indicates tariff escalation. 
 
Table 3.20 Tariff structure for soy bean products at EU border 
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120100 0 0 0 0 240 5,544 
150710 4.8 0 0 0-4.8 504 342 
150790 7.35 0 0 0-7.35 573 368 
230400 0 0 0 0 232 5,923 
Total EU imports 12,177 
Of which from developing countries b) 10,977 
a) EU 15 imports; b) WTO definition of developing countries. 
 
 The EU's total import value adds up to over USD12bn, the bulk of which is 
from importing soy beans (HS 120100) and oil cake (HS 230400) which both 
enter the EU free of import tariffs. Argentina and Brazil are the major suppliers, 
with the latter being a more important origin for EU imports than Argentina. 
However, next to Brazil (USD3.5bn), imports of soybeans are mainly from the 
USA (USD1.1bn in 2007), while imports of beans from Argentina are particularly 
low. On the other hand, imports of oil cake are only from Argentina (USD3.4bn) 
and Brazil (USD2.3bn in 2007). Both countries also play a dominant role as 
supplier of EU imports of soy bean oil. These imports are subject to relatively 
low ad valorem tariffs. 
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 USA soy bean imports are free of tariffs (table 3.21). Ad valorem tariffs on 
oil are much higher at the USA border than at the EU border. Next, there are 
specific tariffs on oil cake that enters the US. The US soy market is more pro-
tected compared to the EU. Also, the US applies significant import tariffs to soy 
bean oil, which points toward tariff escalation. The USA is world's largest soy-
bean producer and imports are therefore very small.  
 
Table 3.21 Tariff structure for soybeans at the US border 
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120100 0 0.00 0.00 0 240 103 
150710 19.1 0.00 0.00 19.1 504 7 
150790 9.55 0.00 0.00 9.55 573 8 
230400 0 4.50 4.50 0 232 28 
Total  146 
 
 In summary, in both the EU's and the US' import tariff structure tariff escala-
tion is observable, yet while the EU is a major importer of soybeans, the US is 
world's largest producer and one of the main exporters in the world.  
 
 
3.8 Wood 
 
The trade chapter on wood products contains 67 tariff lines. From these lines 
24 are included in the definition of agricultural products. These lines are pre-
sented in table 3.22. 
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Table 3.22 Tariff lines in the Chapter wood, included in Agriculture 
Unprocessed raw material 
440110 Fuel wood, in logs/billets/twigs/faggots/similar forms 
440310 Wood, in the rough, whether/not stripped of bark/sapwood/roughly squared, treated 
with paint/stains/creosote/other preservatives 
440320 Wood, in the rough, whether/not stripped of bark/sapwood/roughly squared (exclu-
sive of 4403.10), coniferous 
440341 Dark Red Meranti, Light Red Meranti & Meranti Bakau, in the rough, whether/not 
stripped of bark/sapwood/roughly squared 
440349 Topical wood spec. in SH Note 1 to Ch.44 (exclusive of 4403.41), in the rough, 
whether/not stripped of bark/sapwood/roughly squared 
440391 Oak (Quercus spp.), in the rough, whether/not stripped of bark/sapwood/roughly 
squared 
440392 Beech (Fagus spp.), in the rough, whether/not stripped of bark/sapwood/roughly 
squared 
440399 Wood, in the rough (exclusive of 4403.10-4403.92), whether/not stripped of 
bark/sapwood/roughly squared 
440724 Lumber, Virola, Mahogany 
Semi-processed 
440610 Railway/tramway sleepers (cross-ties) of wood, not impregnated 
440690 Railway/tramway sleepers (cross-ties) of wood, other than those not impregnated 
440710 Wood sawn/chipped length wise, sliced/peeled, whether/not planed, sanded/end-
jointed, of a thickness >6mm, coniferous 
440725 Wood sawn/chipped length wise, sliced/peeled, whether/not planed, sanded/end-
jointed, of a thickness >6mm, of Dark Red Meranti, Light Red Meranti & Meranti 
Bakau 
440726 Wood sawn/chipped length wise, sliced/peeled, whether/not planed, sanded/end-
jointed, of a thickness >6mm, of White Lauan, White Meranti, White Seraya, Yellow 
Meranti & Alan 
440729 Wood sawn/chipped lengthwise, sliced/peeled, whether/not planed, sanded/end-
jointed, of a thickness >6mm, of tropical wood specified in Subheading Note 1 to this 
Ch. (exclusive of 4407.21-4407.28) 
440791 Oak (Quercus spp.), sawn/chipped length wise, sliced/peeled, whether/not planed, 
sanded/end-jointed, of a thickness >6mm 
440792 Beech (Fagus spp.), sawn/chipped length wise, sliced/peeled, whether/not planed, 
sanded/end-jointed, of a thickness >6mm 
440799 Wood (exclusive of 4407.10-4407.95), sawn/chipped lengthwise, sliced/peeled, 
whether/not planed, sanded/end-jointed, of a thickness >6mm 
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Table 3.22 Tariff lines in the Chapter wood, included in Agriculture 
(continued) 
Processed 
440121 Wood, in chips/particles, coniferous 
440122 Wood, in chips/particles, non-coniferous 
440130 Sawdust & wood waste & scrap, whether/not agglomerated in 
logs/briquettes/pellets/similar forms 
440200 Wood charcoal (including shell or nut charcoal) 
440910 Wood (including strips & friezes for parquet flooring, not assembled) continuously 
shaped (tongued, grooved, rebated, chamfered, V-jointed, beaded, moulded, 
rounded/the like) along any of its edges, ends/faces, whether/not planed, 
sanded/end-jo 
440920 Non-conifer wood continuously shaped along any edges 
 The agricultural wood product's tariff structure is presented in table 3.23. 
The sequence is the same as in the table above. Most tariffs are zero. Those 
HS-codes with a tariff all belong to the semi-processed category. These tariffs 
are generally low. Therefore, one cannot speak of tariff escalation. 
 Meanwhile, tariffs on wood products excluded from the agricultural products 
definition are low too (UN-COMTRADE). In some product groups a tariff of 7 to 
8% applies, yet most tariffs applied are very much below that percentage. EU 
import tariffs are highest on products from the USA, Canada, Brazil, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore.  
 Total import value of wood (under the agricultural product definition) of the 
EU15 adds up to USD11.8bn in 2007. The top-3 exporting countries are Russia, 
the USA and Brazil. About half of the import value is related to semi-processed 
products. Only some HS-codes in this group of products are taxed by import tar-
iffs and these account for only a few percentage of the import value. 
 The USA applies import tariffs only to HS 440910 and HS 440920 (shaped 
wood). These tariffs, however, are only around 1% of the import value. 
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Table 3.23 Tariff structure for  wood at the EU border 
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440110 0 0 0 0 52 130 
440310 0 0 0 0 299 19 
440320 0 0 0 0 65 1164 
440341 0 0 0 0 137 5 
440349 0 0 0 0 369 432 
440391 0 0 0 0 173 90 
440392 0 0 0 0 57 116 
440399 0 0 0 0 106 1184 
440724 3.45 0 0 0-1.5 930 55 
440610 0 0 0 0 227 13 
440690 0 0 0 0 182 6 
440710 0 0 0 0 283 3257 
440725 3.0 0 0 0-1.75 737 338 
440726 3.0 0 0 0-1.75 327 17 
440729 3.24 0 0 0-1.5 658 911 
440791 0 0 0 0 543 831 
440792 0 0 0 0 403 140 
440799 0.42 0 0 0-0.42 471 959 
440121 0 0 0 0 62 229 
440122 0 0 0 0 94 116 
440130 0 0 0 0 66 399 
440200 0 0 0 0 362 188 
440910 0 0 0 0 1124 148 
440920 0 0 0 0 1461 1053 
Total EU imports 11800 
Of which from developing countries b) 2733 
a) EU 15 imports; b) WTO definition of developing countries. 
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Table 3.24 Tariff structure for wood at the US border 
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440110 0 0 0 0 52 7 
440310 0 0 0 0 299 56 
440320 0 0 0 0 65 186 
440341 0 0 0 0 137 - 
440349 0 0 0 0 369 1 
440391 0 0 0 0 173 1 
440392 0 0 0 0 57 0 
440399 0 0 0 0 106 28 
440724 0 0 0 0 930 - 
440610 0 0 0 0 227 5 
440690 0 0 0 0 182 5 
440710 0 0 0 0 283 582 
440725 0 0 0 0 737 15 
440726 0 0 0 0 327 212 
440729 0 0 0 0 658 - 
440791 0 0 0 0 543 7 
440792 0 0 0 0 403 1 
440799 0 0 0 0 471 225 
440121 0 0 0 0 62 2 
440122 0 0 0 0 94 8 
440130 0 0 0 0 66 140 
440200 0 0 0 0 362 - 
440910 0.9 0 0 0.9 1,124 824 
440920 1.0 0 0 1.0 1,461 - 
Total  2,305 
 
 In sum, tariffs are generally nonexistent or very low and there is no tariff es-
calation in either the EU's import tariff structure nor in the US' structure.  
 
3.9 Leather 
 
The chapter on raw hides, skins (other than fur skins) and leather (HS 41) 
counts 54 HS-codes. As with wood, only a limited number of the products - 
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hides and skins - are included in the agricultural definition. These products are 
the raw materials that will be used in the leather industry for further processing. 
These raw materials are included in table 3.25.  
 
Table 3.25 Tariff lines of hide and skins which are under the agricultural 
products definition 
410110 Bovine skins, whole, raw 
410121 Bovine hides, whole, fresh or wet-salted 
410122 Butts and bends, bovine, fresh or wet-salted 
410129 Hide sections, bovine, nes, fresh or wet-salted 
410130 Bovine hides, raw, nes 
410140 Equine hides and skins, raw 
410210 Raw skins of sheep/lambs (fresh/salted/dried/limed/pickled/othw. preserved but 
not tanned/parchment-dressed/further prepared), with wool on 
410221 Raw skins of sheep/lambs, pickled but not tanned/parchment-dressed/further pre-
pared, without wool on 
410229 Raw skins of sheep/lambs (fresh/salted/dried/limed/pickled/othw. preserved, but 
not tanned/parchment-dressed/further prepared), split, other than those excluded 
by Note 1 (c) to this Ch. 
410310 Goat or kid hides and skins, raw, nes 
410390 Raw hides & skins (fresh/salted, dried, limed, pickled/othw. preserved, but not 
tanned, parchment-dressed/further prepared), whether/not dehaired/split, other 
than those excld. by Note 1 (b)/1 (c) to this Ch., n.e.s. in Ch 41 
 
 The overview below shows that the EU does not apply tariffs to imports of 
hides and skins (table 3.26). The import value is about USD1bn, of which is only 
a very small part from developing countries. Main EU suppliers are the Russian 
Federation and the USA.  
 Meanwhile, imports of many non-agricultural products in this Chapter 41 are 
subject to tariffs. These tariffs are up to 9% maximum (e.g. for 'Gloves, et cet-
era). Import tariffs are highest for these imports originating from East-Asian 
countries (including India), some OECD countries, Brazil and Argentina.  
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Table 3.26 Tariff structure for raw hides, skins and leather at the EU 
border 
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410110 0 0 0 0 2,548.50 88 
410121 0 0 0 0 1,788.60 505 
410122 0 0 0 0 1,345.47 16 
410129 0 0 0 0 815.72 51 
410130 0 0 0 0 618.54 21 
410140 0 0 0 0 2,869.55 2 
410210 0 0 0 0 2340 10 
410221 0 0 0 0 4,693.39 166 
410229 0 0 0 0 2,510.53 2 
410310 0 0 0 0 3,299.54 99 
410390 0 0 0 0 1,326.96 25 
Total EU imports 985 
Of which from developing countries b) 53 
a) EU 15 imports; import values HS 410110 to HS 410140 are 2001 data; b) WTO definition of developing 
countries. 
 
 The USA does not tax imports of the agricultural products shown in table 25 
and 26; hence, the tariff structure is identical to the one of the EU. Yet, both the 
EU and the US apply tariffs to leather products processed from these hides and 
skins. Therefore, tariff escalation occurs in this industry. 
 
 
3.10 Cotton 
 
The product category on cotton (HS 52) consists of 131 tariff lines at 6 digit 
level. Because of its length at that detailed level, table 3.27 presents the ap-
plied tariff structure and EU import data at 4-digit level. The EU does not apply 
specific tariffs on imports of any of these cotton product categories, only ad 
valorem tariffs. The tariffs applied are relatively small: 8% of the import value at 
the most. Yet, the data on tariffs shows that the EU clearly applies tariff escala-
tion with respect to cotton product imports: while unprocessed cotton does not 
face tariffs, the imports of the more processed products are indeed taxed by 
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tariffs and these tariffs increase with the processing level. 
 
Table 3.27 Tariff structure (at HS 4-digit) for cotton at the EU border 
Hs4 Description of the tariff line WTO Bound 
ad valorem 
tariff (%) 
Applied 
ad valorem 
tariff (%) 
EU Import 
value 2007 (in 
million USD) a) 
5201 Cotton, not carded or combed 0 0 447 
5202 Cotton yarn waste (including 
thread waste) 
0 0 127 
5203 Cotton, carded or combed 0 0 35 
5204 Cotton sewing thread 4 or 5 0, 3.2 or 4 19 
5205 Cotton yarn, not retail 4 or 4.2 0, 3.2, 4 or 4.2 1,168 
5206 Cotton yarn <85% single 
uncombed or multiple combed, 
not retail 
4 0, 3.2 or 4 43 
5207 Cotton yarn (except sewing 
thread) >85% cotton, retail 
5 5 31 
5208 Plain and/or twill weave cotton 8 0, 6.4 or 8 1,455 
5209 Plain weave cotton, >85% 
>200g/m2, unbleached 
8 0, 6.4 or 8 776 
5210 Plain weave cotton <85% 
+manmade fibre <200g 
unbleached 
8 0, 6.4 or 8 148 
5211 Plain weave cotton, <85% 
+manmade fibre, >200g/m2 
unbleached 
8 0, 6.4 or 8 105 
5212 Woven cotton fabric,  
>200g/m2, unbleached, nes 
8 0, 6.4 or 8 60 
Total EU imports 3,933 
Of which from developing countries b) 3,650 
a) EU 15 imports; import values HS 410110 to HS 410140 are 2001 data; b) WTO definition of developing 
countries. 
 
 Tariff escalation with respect to cotton is even more visible if the imports of 
clothing based on cotton (HS 61,62 and 63) are taken into consideration. Most 
clothing, for instance shirts of cotton, is subject to 12% import tariffs.  
 EU 2007 imports were valued at almost USD4bn. Imports from developing 
countries were more than USD3.6bn.  
 As with the other commodities discussed, the EU charges highest (bound 
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rates or close to bound rates) tariffs on imports of cotton from developed coun-
tries. The picture with respect to developing countries is very mixed: import 
rates depend on history and bilateral agreements whereby ACP and EBA coun-
tries have preferences above other developing countries. This is also the case 
for imports of cotton and cotton based clothes. The EU imports a lot of cotton 
and clothing products from Bangladesh; around USD5.3bn in total. All these im-
ports are free from import duties. China, on the other, is charged the bound tar-
iff rates at the EU border. Yet, imports from China amounted to USD16.5bn in 
2007. Imported cotton and clothes based on cotton from India are also charged 
tariff rates close to the bound rates. Still, the import value of USD5.9bn in 2007 
was substantial. These data indicates that there is no clear correlation between 
EU's country specific import tariff and its related import flow. 
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4 Relation between the levels of tariffs 
and import flows 
 
In the previous section, overviews of tariffs and imports at a detailed 6-digit 
product level have been presented for ten product categories of importance 
both to developing countries and the EU. This section aims at looking at the re-
lation between the level of the tariff and the import flow in a structured way.  
 The problem with import tariffs in general and tariff escalation in particular is 
that it limits or even prevents exporting countries entering a foreign market. Be-
hind this thought is the basic assumption the higher the tariff the lower the im-
port flow. However, based on data observations and analyses, there is no 
indication of an unambiguous relation between EU's import tariffs and import 
flows: high tariffs do not necessarily prevent products from entering the EU and 
there are examples in which imports of products charged with highest tariff 
rates are higher than any other product within the same product category (see 
for instance in the sections on poultry and beef). Below we explore this issue 
and show the results of a quantitative assessment of the link between the two in 
graphs. 
 In figure 4.1, we present a plot of 2004 tariff rates against the three year 
average (2004-2007) import values for all selected agricultural products and 
countries that have been exporting to the EU-15 over the period 1995-2007. 
The graph shows EU import tariffs as a combination of specific and ad valorem 
tariffs, added together in the case a country exporting to the EU faces both of 
them and presented as percentage of the 2004 world market price (source is 
the MacMapHS6 database). The graph shows the scattered observations of im-
port flows, with imports coming in against high and low tariffs. Most import 
flows are against zero or rather low tariffs (up to 20-25%). Import values are ei-
ther rather small or quite large. Imports do occur against high tariffs too, and in 
quite some cases the import values are significant. Generally, hence, the prepo-
sition of the negative relation between the level of tariffs and the level of imports 
does not seem to be confirmed by the data in this graph.  
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Figure 4.1 Link between EU tariff rates and its import values, for ten 
product categories selected for this study 
 
 
 Also, if we focus on product categories or on the distinction between proc-
essed and unprocessed products we do not find convincing results indicating at 
a negative correlation between the level of tariffs and imports. This outcome 
also seems to support the statement presented in section 1.2 that tariffs are 
not the decisive factor in EU's imports, but that other factors such a consumer 
preferences, compliance to standards and supply factors (in the exporting coun-
try) are important too. 
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Figure 4.2 Trend in EU imports of ten selected product categories from 
several country groups 
 
 
 The above analysis does not indicate, however, that high tariffs do not re-
strain trade. They surely may act as market entry barriers (simply because it 
raises the price of imports against domestic supply), but it is difficult to show 
how much they do among all other factors that may influence trade too. A way 
to show the possible effect of tariffs on trade is to present the trend in EU im-
ports while there has been changes in the import tariffs over time. Unfortu-
nately, we do not have a dataset on tariff rates at different years, but we know 
that due to the WTO Uruguay Round import tariffs have been adjusted and de-
clined step by step in the years 1995-2000. Also, the EU and the 48 less devel-
oped countries adopted the EBA initiative arranging free access to the EU for 
this group of developing countries (see section 2). Figure 4.2 shows the trend in 
EU imports of the ten selected product categories making a distinction between 
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different set of (groupings of) countries. The orange line in this figure shows the 
average increase of EU imports over the period 1995-2007. The slope of the 
line representing the import from the EBA countries is significantly steeper than 
the 'average' since 2002, which is the first year the EBA agreement was in 
force, allowing a tariff free market access to the Union from that year onwards 
(except for sugar). This indicates that EBA countries have benefitted from that 
agreement by exploiting their export opportunities to a greater extent than their 
competitors. Whether this is only because of the tariff elimination or also due to 
other factors, would be subject to further research.  
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5 Conclusions 
 
 
This study shows that EU tariff escalation does occur in agricultural imports for a 
number of products but not for all. Based on a quick scan of EU imports of ten se-
lected agricultural product groups, UN trade statistics and a detailed tariff dataset 
the conclusion is that the EU applies tariff escalation on it's imports of cocoa, to-
matoes, palm oil, soy, leather and cotton: import tariffs (a combination of specific 
and ad valorem tariffs) applied on these product categories are higher for proc-
essed than for unprocessed products. There are, however, no signs of tariff esca-
lation at EU's imports of sugar, poultry meat, beef, wood and hides & skins. EU 
import tariffs on sugar and beef are high for all tariff lines, raw materials as well 
as processed products. The imports of wood and hides & skins are not or only 
very little taxed by tariffs. Table 5.1 summarises these findings.  
 Developing countries are the main source of EU imports of all products sub-
ject to this study, except for wood. The EU has offered many developing coun-
tries preferential treatment in their agricultural exports to the Union. Especially 
the ACP and EBA countries benefit from the absence of, or the relatively low EU 
import tariffs.  
 Starting from the proposition that high import tariffs may be a serious ob-
stacle for exporting countries to enter the importing country, we were seeking a 
link between the level of tariffs and import values in the EU data. The analysis 
per product category and for the whole sample in general shows no strong evi-
dence for such a link: high import tariffs do not correspond much with low im-
ports and low tariffs do not correlate significantly with high import values. In 
quite a number of cases it was found that the major import item of the product 
category happened to be the one with significant import tariffs (compared to tar-
iffs applied to other products in that group).  
 The lack of a unambiguous relation between (high) tariffs and (low) import 
flows does not, however, indicate tariffs do not act as barriers to trade. The ex-
ample of the EBA agreement, in force since 2002, point at a positive impact on 
the less developed countries' export opportunities to the EU after the Union's 
import tariffs had been abolished. The data indicate that EBA exports have in-
creased more than exports from other countries, thereby strengthening their 
market share in EU imports.  
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Table 5.1 Summary of major findings 
Product  Tariff wedge (min. and max. ad valorem tariff) Tariff escalation? 
Cocoa 0-9.6 Yes 
Tomato 0-16.4 Yes 
Palm oil 0-9.5 Yes 
Sugar 0-18 No 
Poultry meat 0-8.5 No 
Beef 0-15.4 No 
Soybeans 0-7.35 Yes 
Wood 0-3.45 No 
Hides & Skins 0 No 
Cotton 0-8 Yes 
Overall No 
 
 The level of imports is determined by more factors than the level of the im-
port tariff only; demand and/or consumer preferences for these products, their 
quality (which provides them a price premium) and the lack of domestic supply 
are some of the other determining factors. The question whether developing 
countries are hampered to export to the EU because of Union's perceived high 
tariffs (or, stated otherwise: whether developing countries would benefit from an 
EU import tariff reduction) is difficult to answer without a further analysis of de-
mand and supply trends in both the EU and developing countries, and of other 
market and product specific characteristics (that should comply with EU public 
standards on quality, et cetera) that all contribute to the competitiveness of the 
supplier at the international market. This, however, goes beyond the scope of 
this brief analysis into the tariff escalation features of the EU agricultural import 
protection structure. 
 Based on the tariff and trade database available, further analysis could ex-
plore the relation between the tariff levels and import flows by comparing import 
data (tariffs and import flows) of OECD countries. Variations in tariffs between 
OECD countries with a comparable income level could indicate an effect of tar-
iffs on import flows. By focusing on imports of OECD countries one excludes the 
effects on imports caused by the differences in consumer patterns due to dif-
ferences in income levels. At the same time such an approach would not give 
insights into the extent developing countries would be able to supply their pro-
duce in the international markets at competitive rates, complying with all stan-
dards regarding quality and food safety. 
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